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EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES OF DISCRIMINATION 
VERSUS COMPETITION IN SEALED-BID 
AUCTION MARKETS* 
VERNON L. SMITHt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I N TIIIS ~tudy, attention focuses on the behaVIor of a class of auction mar-kets where formal organization re-
quires the individual competing bidders 
to submit one or more written "sealed 
bids" specifying the quantity and price 
at which they are committed to buy (or 
sell) units of the item being traded. 
In many such markets only a single 
unit, such as a contract for the construc-
tion of a bridge or building, is involved. 
The experimental designs and theory 
underlying this study assume that many 
units of the item are to be offered for 
sale (or are required to be purchased). 
Perhaps the most important continuing 
market having this structure is the auc-
tion market for new Treasury bills with 
maturities of 91 and 182 days. Other 
examples might be the letting of con-
tracts for transportation service, where 
the service requirements are in excess 
of the capacity of any single firm or the 
letting of material contracts, ~y for 
cement, where the requirements exceed 
the capacity of any one producer. 
Our primary purpose is to study indi-
vidual bidding behavior and price de-
termination under two alternative forms 
of market organization: (1) price dis-
crimination, under which successful in-
* This research was supported by National Sci-
ence Foundation Grant No. GS-370 to Purdue Uni-
versity. I wish to thank Mr. Meyer W. Belovicz for 
conducting one of the experimental sessions. 
t Professor of economics and administrative sci-
ence, Purdue University. 
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dividual bids are £lied at their bid 
prices, and (2) pure competition, under 
which successful individual bids are filled 
at the same market-clearing price. The 
methodology is that of the controlled 
laboratory experiment, in which the 
major "treatment" variables are the 
instructions defining the rules for accept-
ing subject bids under the two forms of 
market organization. 
n. INSTITUTIONAL EXAMPLES: THE 
TREASURY-BILL AUCTION 
For institutional background we dis-
cuss briefly some mechanics of the 
Treasury-bill auction. This auction is an 
ideal example because its organization 
and functioning are known in consider-
able detail, and it has been proposed 
that the discriminative practice of the 
Treasury be replaced by a competitive 
procedure.1 However, the bill auction, 
1 Andrew Brimmer, uPrice Determination in the 
United States Treasury Bill Market," RerJi~ of 
Economics and Slf.Jtistics, XLIV, No.2 (May, 1962), 
178-83; Deane Carson, uTreasury Open Market 
Operations,n Ret>iew of Econonz,ics and St4bistic.s, Vol. 
XLI, No. 4 (November, 1959) ; Henry Goldstein 
"The Friedman Proposal for Auctioning Treasur; 
Bills," Jo1~rnaJ of Polilual EcotUJtny, L'XX, No. 4 
(August, 1962), 386-92; Joint Economic Commit-
tee, Congress of the United States, "Constructive 
S~~estions for Reco~cili~g and Simultaneously Ob-
tainmg the Three ObJectives of Maximum Employ-
ment, and Adequate Rate of Growth and Substan-
tial Stability of the Price Level," Hea~ings: Employ-
ment, Growth anil Price LefJels (86th Cong., 1st sess., 
October, 1959), Part 9A, pp. 3023- 26; 'Milton Fried-
man, A Program for M OJJetary Stability (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1960), pp. 63-65· and 
Michael Rieber, "Collusion in the Auction M~rket 
for Treasury Bills," Joumal of Politi-eal Economy, 
LXXII, No. 5 (October, 1964), 509-12. 
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as such, has no dominating interest for 
this study. Our interest is in the general 
characteristics of the sealed-bid auction 
and the effect of price discrimination and 
pure competition on behavior, whether 
the commodity be securities or potatoes. 
The bill auction is a weekly phenom-
enon beginning each Wednesday when 
the Treasury releases an announcement, 
through the Reserve Banks, inviting 
tenders for a specified amount of 91-day 
and 182-day issues. The weekly offering 
of 91-day issues amounts to around one 
billion dollars, that of th.e longer issue 
about half a billion. The resulting bids 
are normally tendered the following 
Monday to each Reserve Bank by the 
bill investors in each Federal Reserve 
district. Delivery is made to the success-
ful bidders on the following Thursday. 
Before 1947, all bids had to be entered at 
a specified price. Since 1947, investors 
have had the option of submitting non-
competitive bids for limited amounts of 
bills. The successful competitive bids are 
filled at their individual-bid prices, while 
the non-competitive bids are filled at a 
quantity-weighted average of the ac-
cepted competitive bids. (Incidentally, 
"competitive" as used in the Treasury-
auction literature does not mean "com-
petitive" as we shall employ the term in 
contrast to the term "discriminative.") 
To illustrate price determination, sup-
pose that the net offering of ninety-one-
day bills to the competitive bidders is 
Q0 in Figure !. Qo would be the total 
offering minus the amount of non-com-
petitive bids. The array of competitive 
bids from highest to lowest forms an 
effective demand, dd, for the offering. 
The lowest accepted bid would be at P L, 
the highest at P s. 
In this illustration, the gross receipts 
from the offering are given by the area 
under dd and to the left of Qo in Figure 
1. Thus, with respect to the effective 
demand curve, dd, the seller acts as a 
perfect price discriminator, receiving all 
the buyer's rent or surplus under the 
demand curve. By contrast, if this mar-
ket were operated to simulate a perfectly 
competitive auction, and if we assume 
the same bids to have been submitted 
as in the example for price discrimina-
tion, the result would have been the 
uniform market-clearing price, P L, for 
Pnce 
Oo Ouantit~ 
FIG. 1.-Price determination in the bill auction 
all successful bidders. Under these as-
sumptions, the Treasury receives greater 
revenue as a consequence of practicing 
price discrimination. However, as is dem-
onstrated in the bidding theory out-
lined in Appendix I , it is not necessarily 
the case that the bids will be the same 
under price discrimination as under a 
purely competitive market organization.' 
For illustration, suppose each bidder, 
i, in the market has a firm reservation 
price, P ,, that he is willing to pay for a 
unit of the item traded. Then the "po-
' A1so d. Goldstein, op. cit., pp. 391-92. 
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tential" demand, or limit-price set, is 
determined by the ordered set [P ,] ar-
rayed in descending order from highest 
to lowest. Such a set is illustrated by DD 
in Figure 1 and corresponds to the de-
mand curve of ordinary price theory. As 
is shown in Appendix I, under price 
discrimination the optimal-price bid for 
any buyer is not in general equal to his 
reservation limit, P,. Intuitively, when 
a buyer knows that a successful bid will 
be 6.11ed at his bid price, it is evident that 
he will bid more conservatively tban if 
he knows it will be filled at the marginal 
bid price of all the buyers. If the limit-
price set is DD under a purely competi-
tive organization, then the effective de-
mand under price discrimination might 
be as shown by dd in Figure 1. It follows 
that for a given DD, and a single auction, 
price discrimination might yield a seller, 
such as the Treasury in the bill auction, 
more or less revenue than a simulated 
purely competitive auction. A seller gets 
less revenue under price discrimination 
if area A < area B. Over time, with re-
peat bidding in successive (daily, weekly, 
etc.) discrimination auctions, if the DD 
and SS conditions were constant, it is 
clear that the unsuccessful bidders in 
earlier auctions would tend to raise their 
bids, while the successful bidders would 
tend to lower their bids. Consequently, 
area B would approach zero, as tid (to 
the right of SS) rose toward DD. But in 
any real market, and most certainly in 
the bill auction, both DD and SS change 
from one auction to another. Hence the 
price uncertainties which lead one to 
expect tid to be below DD may persist 
indefinitely over time.' An important ob-
jective of our experimental design will be 
to capture the essence of this uncertainty 
io a laboratory setting. 
The above considerations arise in an 
auction conducted by a single buyer, 
except that in this case the demand curve 
is vertical at the desired quantity and 
the purely competitive supply curve is 
formed from the ordered set of offer-
limit prices. Under discrimination the 
supply-price bids would tend to exceed 
the limit-supply prices. The effective 
supply function would therefore be to 
the left of that prevailing in a competi-
tive auction. If the difference were suffi-
ciently great a buyer might pay more 
for the purchase under discrimination 
than in a competitive auction . 
m. THE EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM 
In designing an experimental para-
digm for the study of behavior in the 
sealed-bid auction market it will not be 
our objective, even if it were possible, 
to simulate the institutional details of 
any particular market such as the 
Treasury-bill auction. We shall be con-
cerned, rather, with creating a group 
task situation that reflects the essential 
economic characteristics of such a mar-
ket. These characteristics seem to be 
three in number: 
1. The individual participants in such a 
market can be expected to place (a) different 
and (b) uncertain subjective valuations on the 
commodity being exchanged. 
2. The price at which units of the com-
modity can be purchased in the auction cannot 
be known with certainty at the time the par-
ticipants tender their irrevocable bids. 
3. The rules for determining who pays how 
much for the commodity might be either of the 
discriminative form or the purely competitive 
form. 
These characteristics are incorporated 
into the experimental design by requiring 
a There is even uncertainty as to SS in the bill 
auction since the Treasury announcement always 
invites tenders for SX billion. or O•ereabout.s. Tbe 
Treasury is thereby in a position to cut Lhe bid array 
with its own reservation sale price if the bids are 
unusually thin or thick . In practice, there seems to 
be negligible deviation between the announced of~ 
fering and the actual volume of bids accepted. 
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the subjects to submit irrevocable bids 
for units of an abstract commodity, of-
fered inelastically in specified quantity, 
for resale at a price that is a random 
variable with a specified mass or fre-
quency function. The subjects are paid 
in U.S. currency a sum equal to the 
algebraic difference between selling price 
and purchase price. Since the subjects 
may be presumed to have different sub-
jective valuations (utility functions) for 
money, this paradigm satisfies condition 
l(a). Condition l(b) is satisfied by mak-
ing resale price a random variable. The 
fact that it is a known random variable 
corresponds roughly in a real market to 
the knowledge and judgmental ability 
that the participants gain from experi-
ence. Condition 2 is satisfied by prohib-
iting communication among the sub-
jects. Hence, no individual subject can 
have certain knowledge, in advance, of 
purchase price or selling price. Of course 
Condition 3 is satisfied by varying the 
bidding rules as between two experi-
mental groups. 
In the Treasury-bill market this ex-
perimental paradigm corresponds most 
directly to the dealer participants who 
buy in the primary auction for purposes 
of resale in the secondary, existing-asset 
market. Dealer profits are squeezed from 
below by uncertainty as to the lowest ac-
cepted bid that will prevail in the Treas-
ury auction and from above by uncer-
tainty as to the price at which they can 
resell the bills in the existing-asset mar-
ket. The assumption that "resale price" 
is uncertain may also correspond indi-
rectly to the behavior of some non-dealer 
bidders in the Treasury auction. Thus, 
although a participant may not be buy-
ing for resale, he may still be influenced, 
in placing his bids, by his estimate of the 
expected future price of bills in the 
secondary market at the time of delivery 
of new bills acquired in the auction. If 
he wishes to minimize his opportunity 
cost of buying in the primary market, 
when he might have bought in the sec-
ondary at a more favorable price, such 
behavior would be formally equivalent 
to that of a dealer bidding to ma:<imize 
some utility function of profit. 
IV. THE HYPOTHESES 
Prior to conducting the e:tperiments 
reported in this paper several specific hy-
potheses were formulated, which helped 
to govern the experimental design. In 
each case we will state the research hy-
pothesis, it being understood that the 
classical null alternative is the negative 
of the research hypothesis. The use of a 
C will refer to "competitive treatment," 
aD to "discriminative treatment." 
The basic hypothesis, labeled H 2, 
grows directly out of the intuitive argu-
ments in the previous section and the 
bidding theory in Appendix 1: 
H.: In the lth auction period, the bids, B~, 
tendered by subjects in a C group will exceed' 
the bids, Bh, tendered by subjects in the corre-
sponding D group, that is, Bb > Bh, ' = 1, 2, 
3, ... 
When we come to test H 2 it will be 
necessary to select a test procedure. The 
obvious classical test is a simple one-
tailed t-test on the means of the bids. 
However, the 1-test requires the assump-
tion that the two samples being com-
pared are from populations with the 
same variance. Therefore, before H, can 
be tested, it is necessary to formulate a 
hypothesis as to the behavior of the 
variance of bids tendered under the two 
'The precise meaning of "exceed" is defined im-
plicitly by the bid-test statistic used in the compari-
son. The use of a l-test would imply that the mtt~n 
B~ and B'D would satisty the inequality B'c > B~. 
The use of a rank-order non-parametric test would 
imply that the sum, mean, or other function of the 
ranks assigned to bid! satisfied the hypothesized in· 
equality. 
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treatments. Such a hypothesis will be of 
intrinsic interest in that, if true, it will 
reflect a behavioral difference caused by 
the different treatments. What in fact 
can we expect? Will the variance of the 
bids under condition C be greater, equal, 
or less than the variance of the bids un-
der condition D? The following argument 
suggests that the variance will be 
greater: 
The individual bidder in a discrimina-
tive auction is uncertain as to whether a 
given bid will be successful, but if it is 
successful he is certain about the pur-
chase price-his purchase price, by defi-
ward risk vary among individual sub-
jects, some will "gamble" with high bids, 
others will play it safe with more con-
servative bids. Hence, the variance of 
bids under C should exceed that of bids 
under D. 
H1: In the lth auclion period, the variance of 
bids tendered by subjects in a C group, V(B~), 
will exceed the variance o£ bids tendered by sub-
jects in the corresponding D group, V(B\,), 
that is, V(Bh) > V(Bl,), I = 1, 2, 3, .. . 
It is instructive to consider the ration-
ale for H 1 and H, from the point of view 
of a game matrix. Consider the following 
highly simplliied illustration: Suppose an 
TABLE I 
SUBJECT'S PAYOFF 
bS111S;r&cr 
BIDS 
HYPO'tlfETlC\J. D PAYOFJ' lliDJX HYIOnttTICAt. C PAYOl'r llinrx 
If Othen Bid (or the Low Bid l1): U Othus Bid {or the La. Bad Is) : 
0 ~-;--:--~-
0 1 0 0 
-1 1 0 -t 
1........... t 
2.. ........ 0 
3 . ... .. .... . -1 
nition, will be his bid price. He has little 
incentive to bid "high," for although it 
will increase the certainty that a bid will 
be accepted it raises his purchase price 
and lowers his profit. But in a competi-
tive auction the individual bidder faces 
uncertainty both as to whether a given 
bid will be accepted and as to what his 
purchase price will be. If he bids high 
this increases his chance of success, and, 
provided that others bid low, his pur-
chase price is low, and he makes a profit. 
The individual is not penalized no matter 
how much his bid exceeds the lowest ac-
cepted bid. But if others bid high it 
raises the purchase price to all, and all 
suffer losses. This implies greater risk 
under condition C, and, if attitudes to-
individual subject can enter one of three 
bids, 1, 2, or 3, and that resale price is 
1, 2, or 3, with equal probability. Also 
assume that when a subject ties with 
others for low bids be has a ! chance of 
having his bid accepted. Now imagine 
that a typical subject is concerned with 
what he should bid on the assumption 
that others bid (or the low bid is) a 1, 2, 
or 3. Under the D or C conditions our 
subject might perceive the payoffs given 
in Table 1. 
In D, if he bids 1 and others bid 1, his 
bid is accepted t the time, giving a 
profit of 0, 1, or 2 with chances t each. 
Hence, payoff averages t. If he bids 1 
and others a 2 or 3, he gets nothing. II he 
bids 2 and others 1, his bid is accepted 
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but at an average profit of 0. If he bids 
2 and others 2 he still averages 0, while 
if others bid 3 his bid is never accepted, 
giving 0, and so on. In D it is best to go 
low, while a high bid never pays. Some 
might try bids of 2 since it still involves 
fair odds, and one could "get lucky." 
l-Ienee, bids of 1 are most likely, with 
perhaps a few at the resale mean, 2. 
Note that a bid of 1 is both the co-opera-
tive (joint maximizing) and the selfish 
course of action. 
The same payoff vector accrues in C 
for a bid of 1. If our hypothetical subject 
bids 2 and others 1, his bid is always 
accepted and filled at 1, the lowest ac-
cepted bid, giving an average profit of 
1 ( = t · 0 +! · 1 + t · 2). If he bids 
2 and others 2, he averages 0, and so on~ 
In C it is best to bid 2. However, if a 
subject is anxious to co-operate he might 
bid 11 which cannot generate a loss. If 
he hopes to intimidate others into mak-
ing low bids he will bid rivalistically at 3, 
risking a loss of ! but also infticting a 
loss of ! on all others who bid 3. The 
"right" course of action is less evident 
inC than in D. 
From this example it is clear that the 
bids would tend to be higher in C than 
in D (H2). Given that subject attitudes 
toward risk and toward punishing versus 
co-operative strategies are likely to vary, 
it is seen that the C bids would tend to 
have a higher variance than D bids (H1). 
Given the validity of H2, it is con-
jectural whether the bids will be high 
enough in the C group to yield a monopo-
listic seller greater revenue under com-
petition than discrimination. This pros-
pect was considered sufficiently likely to 
assert the following hypothesis: 
Hs: In the tth auction period the total 
revenue to a seller in a C group, Rb, will exceed 
that in the corresponding D group, R1J that is, 
~ > Rb, t = 1, 2, 3, .. • 
Although the classical experimental 
methodology calls for independent sub-
ject groups to be exposed to the treat-
ment conditions whose effects are to be 
compared, there is an important sense 
in which such a procedure is artificial in 
the present context. In any actual insti-
tutional form of the sealed-bid auction, 
such as the Treasury-bill auction, the 
participants have a long-standing ex-
perience with the discriminative form of 
organization. If market orgamzation is 
changed to the competitive form, will 
the previous history and experience have 
an important effect on behavior under 
the new conditions? If one is concerned 
with the Carson-Friedman policy pro-
posal, namely 7 to change from discrimi-
native rules to competitive rules/' then 
the relevant experiment is to expose the 
same group of subjects initially to the 
discriminative treatment for a series of 
bid periods, then to the competitive 
treatment. Although some ((hystereses" 
(or path-dependent) phenomena may be 
detectable, it is expected that the above 
propositions will be valid when the same 
experimental group is exposed first to 
the D, then to the C, conditions. The 
above three hypotheses will be labeled 
H~, H~, and H3 when applied to com-
parable bid periods under the D and C 
conditions for the same experimental 
group. 
Although we are prepared to predict 
that the bids will be lower and the seller's 
receipts lower under discrimination, it is 
apparent that such results are not likely 
to be independent of market conditions, 
in particular the relative number of re-
jected bids. Ceteris parib·us, it would 
appear that the greater the volume of 
rejected bids the higher would tend to be 
the bids under either the C or D condi-
5 Carson, op. cit.; Joint Economic Committee, 
op. cit. 
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tion. However, since we expect the 
bids to be higher, and therefore the 
trading gains thinner, under C (as op-
posed to D), we will expect the volume of 
excess bids to have its most pronounced 
effect under condition D. Indeed, at some 
point, as the number of bidders is 
increased in successive experimental 
groups, with the offering quantity con-
stant, the differential effect of the C and 
D conditions on seller revenue may dis-
appear. These expectations will be tested 
via hypotheses H4 and H6. 
The instruction sheets given each sub-
ject in the D experiments, and read aloud 
to the entire group, are reproduced in 
Appendix II. Appendix II also contains 
the C instructions. 
Group III participated in two experi-
ments conducted in sequence. In the 
first experiment (IIID), the D instruc-
tions were read, followed by a trial auc-
tion, then by eight auctions for money. 
Then without advance warning the C 
instructions were read followed by eight 
more auctions (experiment IIIC). The 
TABLE 2 
EXPERIMENTAL-DESIGN CONDITIONS 
Experiment Purchase--Price Rules 
ID ........ Discriminative 
IIC ....... Competitive 
TIID ...... D.iscriminative} 
UIC ...... Competitive 
IVD ...... Discriminative 
vc ....... Competitive 
H.: With a. fixed offer quantity, in corre-
sponding auction periods, bids tendered by sub-
jects in D groups, Bl>, will be higher the greater 
the number of rejected bids, that is, Bl> (N Ri) > 
Bf>(NR2) > Bl>(NRa) > ... , t = 1, 2, 3, ... , 
if N R1 > N R2 > NRa > .. . 
IL: Same as H. applied to C groups, that is, 
Bb(N Ri) > BMN R!) > BMN Ra) > ... , 
1 = 1, 2, 3, ... , if NR1 > NRt > NR.a > .. . 
V. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A total of seventy-seven subjects, all 
in undergraduate courses in economics 
and industrial management at Purdue, 
participated in a design block of six 
experiments conducted in five groups or 
sessions. No subject participated in more 
than one session. The relevant experi-
mental conditions for each session are 
designated in Table 2. Roman numerals 
I through V refer to the .five subject 
groups in the chronological order in 
which the experiments were conducted. 
. 
No. o{ No. of Re- No. of Bid 
Subjects jeeted Bid.s Periods 
15 12 s 
15 12 5 
13 { ~ r 8 l 8 
17 16 10 
17 16 10 
other four experiments were conducted 
on independent groups of subjects. 
Group III consisted of an entire stu-
dent class, whereas the other groups 
were randomized out of much larger 
classes. As a means of controlling on 
pregame conditions the classes were 
given no advance warning that they 
would serve as captive subjects in an 
experiment. End effects were controlled 
by withholding information on the num-
ber of auction periods. 
As indicated in the instructions, in 
each experiment the number of bids that 
could be submitted by a subject was 
arbitrarily set at two. The quantity of-
fered, X, was announced at the begin-
ning of each auction period. This offering 
was eighteen units in all periods of all 
experiments, but the subjects discovered 
this only through the sequential an-
nouncements. Hence, in experiments ID 
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and TIC, a total of thirty bids (fifteen 
subjects) was submitted of which twelve 
were rejected. Similarly in IIID and 
nrc eight bids were rejected out of 
twenty-six, and in IVD· and VC we have 
sixteen bids rejected out of thirty-four. 
In each auction of each experiment a 
subject's profit on a successful bid was 
(selling price) - (purchase price), zero 
otherwise, this sum to be added to or 
subtracted from his $1.00 starting capi~ 
tal. In both the D and C auctions the 
lowest successful bid was determined by 
arraying the bids from highest to lowest 
and accepting the first X bids. In the 
C auctions "purchase price" was deter-
mined by the lowest successful market 
bid, while in the D auctions it was de-
termined by the bid price on each indi-
vidual accepted bid. In both auctions 
TABLE 3 
BID FREQUENCIES BY AUCTION PERIOD• 
AUCTION AoonoN 
Bros Bms 
I 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 8 
Experiment ID Experiment liD 
<$0.4-5 .. ... <$0.45 .... . 
0 . 55 .... . 0.55 . .. .. 
0 .65 .. ... 0.65 .. ... 1 1 
0.75 ..... 2 0. 75 .... . 3 0 
0 .85 ... .. 2 1 0.85 . .. .. 6 2 
0 .95 . .. . . ~ 0.95 . . .. . 9 11 1 1.05 . .... 2 1 1.05 . .. .. 1 7 11 2 1 1.15 . . ... 10 1 1.15 ..... 4 3 12 11 2 2 1 1.25 . . .. . 4 5 4 14 19 1.25 ..... 0 0 2 12 17 8 9 9 
1.35 . .... 1 ~ 1 4 9 1.35 ..... 0 _l_fl 1 6 16 15 16 
1.45 .. . .. 1.45 . . ... 2 I I 2 I 
1.55 . ... . 1.55 ... . . 
1.65 .. .. . 1.65 ..... 
1.75 .. .. . 1.75 ..... 
1.85 ... .. 1.85 . .. .. 
1.95 ... .. 1.95 .. .. . 
> 2.05 ..... > 2.05 . .. . . 
Experiment TIC Experiment nrc 
<$0.45 .. ... 1 1 1 <$0.45 . ... . 
0 .55 .. ... 0 0 0 0 .55 . .... 
0 .65 .... . 0 1 .. II ~· 0 0 .65 ... . . 
0.75 ... .. 1 0 0 0 .75 .. ... 2 
0.85 ..... 0 0 r."f 1 0 0 .85 ... .. 2 
0.95 ..... 2 2 2 1 0 0 .95 .... . 2 
1.05 . .... 2 1 0 0 0 1.05 ..... 0 
1.15 . .... 5 2 3 2 3 1.15 . . .. . 1 1 2 
1.25 ..... 
-r---h 3 2 1 1.25 ..... 6 4 2 3 3 3 1.35 ..... 6 4 5 4 1.35 . . ... 5 7 3 4 3 5 6 8 
1.45 ..... 2 4 7 5 6 1.45 .... . 3 6 8 6 11 9 10 10 
1.55 . .. . . 3 4 5 9 6 1.55 .. ... 2 6 3 6 5 5 7 6 
1.65 . .... 0 3 2 1 3 1.65 .... . 2 0 2 1 0 3 0 0 
1. 75 ..... 3 2 2 2 4 1.75 .... . 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1.85 . .. . . 1 0 1 1 0 1.85 .. . .. 0 1 3 2 4 1 3 2 
1.95 . .. .. I 1 1 0 2 1.95 .. . .. 1 1 3 2 I 
~ 2.05 .... . ~ > 2.05 ..... 
a Bids between the rules "" accepted bid range. 
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uselling price, was determined by in-
dependent drawings from a rectangular 
distribution over the nine prices, $1.15, 
$1.25, $1.35, ... , $1.95. Each auction 
began with an announcement that eight-
een units were being offered for sale and 
ended with an announcement of the 
highest accepted bid, the lowest accepted 
bid, and the result of the drawing to de-
termine "resale price." All data were 
written on the blackboard at the time 
of announcement and left there in tabu-
lar form for the duration of the eA."Peri-
ment. 
Each session began with a trial auc-
tion which did not count toward the 
computation of the subject's cash re-
wards. Following the trial auction fur-
ther questions concerning the mechanics 
of the auction were invited. The same 
TABLE 4 
BID FREQUENCIES BY AUCTION PERIOD .. 
AUCTION 
Bms 
t 2 3 4 s 6 7 8 9 10 
Experiment IV D 
<$0.45 ......... . 
0.55 .......... 
0.65 .......... 
0.75 .......... 
0.85 .......... 
0.95 ..... . .... 2 1 
1.05 .......... 3 2 
1.15 .......... 7 4 2 1 1 
1.25 .......... 12 I 9 8 2 3 2 2 1 1 
1.35 .......... 8 17 11 15 111 12 4 4 3 3 
1.45 .......... 2 1 13 14 20 17 26 26 26 27 
1.55 .......... ~ 3 1 3 4 4 
1.65 .......... 
1. 75 .......... 
1.85 . . ........ 
1.95 ......... . 
~ 2.05 .......... 
Experiment VC 
<SO 45 .......... 1 1 1 4 2 2 2 2 3 
0.55 .......... 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.65 .......... 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0. 75 ... .. ..... 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.85 .......... 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.95 . . ........ 5 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1.05 .......... 3 3 2 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 
l.l5 ......... . 
---r--n 2 1 2 5 3 2 1 0 1.25 .......... 3 4 1 2 3 3 3 3 
1.35 .......... 2 l 71 3 1 4 7 5 6 5 
1.45 ..... . .... 1 1 3 6 8 5 2 2 4 LL 
1.55 .......... 2 l 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 7 
1.65 .......... 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1. 7.5 .......... 1 1 3 3 4 3 5 4 4 2 
1. 8.5 .......... 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 2 1 0 
1.95 ......... 1 0 3 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 
> 2.05 .......... 7 8 4 7 8 9 6 6 4 1 
a Bids between rules = accepted bid range. 
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random sequence of resale prices was 
used in all experiments (except IIID, 
since it was the same subject group as 
IIIC) as a control on the effect of par-
ticular sequences. 
VI. RESULTS, TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 
The data to be analyzed from the five 
experiments are compiled in Tables 3 
Price 
225 
205 
45 
2S 
and 4. Complete protocols of bids by 
individual subjects are reported in Ap-
pendix ill. Tables 3 and 4 contain the 
frequency of each bid tendered in each 
auction period. The highest and lowest 
of the accepted bids, by auction period, 
are indicated by the rules. Except for 
ties at the low-bid price which were 
randomly assigned to the acceptance and 
I Rej~ehdBid$ 
s 10 12 14 16 IS ~ n ~ ~ n 30 n 
Q11antity 
FIG. 2.-Experiments IIlD and illC, auction period 1 
IRolechdBids 
I 10 12 14 1& It N n ~ N U ~ U 
Quntity 
FIG. 3.-Experiments lliD and illC, auction period 8 
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rejection sets, the bids between these 
rules constitute the acceptance set of 
bids. For example, in auction period 3, 
experiment IIC, eighteen bids were be-
tween $1.45 and $1.95, and therefore all 
were accepted. In auction 4 of the same 
experiment, nineteen bids fell in the 
$1.45--{12 .05 range. Hence, one of the 
$1.45 bids was randomly selected for 
rejection. 
It should be noted that five auctions in 
addition to the trial auction were run in 
" 
" 
the first two experiments, W and IC. 
Since the bid frequencies, the lowest 
accepted bid, and seller total revenue 
appear not to have stabilized, the num-
ber of auctions was increased to eight 
in e>.-periments IIW and illC and to ten 
in experiments ND and VC. Actually 
the question of equilibrium over time is 
a moot one. In a real market, conditions 
are not likely to remain constant long 
enough to achieve a static equilibrium. 
On the other hand, the participants in 
1 4 I I 11 12 14 II II 21 1Z 14 2li n lG n l4 
Ollantity 
FIG. 4.-Experiments IVD and VC, auction period 1 
FtG. 5.-'Experime.nts IVD and VC, auction period 10 
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real markets are more experienced than 
subjects in laboratory experimental mar-
kets, and the behavior of the latter may 
be more comparable to that of the former 
only after several trials of learning ex-
perience. 
The sample demand curves generated 
by the bid arrays in the first and last 
auction periods of experiments IIID, 
IIIC, IVD, and VC are provided in Fig-
ures 2-5. These charts convey some idea 
of the variation in the demand curves 
is the ratio of the variance of bids ten-
dered under C to those tendered under D. 
Only two of the twenty-three compared 
variances fail to be significantly different 
in the predicted direction at a probabili-
ty levels of less than .00 1. In the experi-
ment VC, the bid variance in every period 
was several thousand times as large as 
in IVD. In IVD and VC nearly bali of 
the bids were rejected in each auction, 
putting the maximum pressure (relative 
to the other experiments) on subjects 
TABLE 5 
F-RATIO TEsT OF H1 AND Hr 
V(Bc) > V(B~) 
P-RA'tiO• V (B'c)/V (Bo) 
Degrees or 
Paired Freedom I ~· Experim~ua fc !o lD-liC ......... 29 29 4 3 15 3 lliD·lllC ...... 25 25 23 .. 9 8 
lVD-VC ........ 31 31 7,582 b 
• In order of predicUd increasing levd of bids. 
1o All these F'a ue vr.ry larzt . 
• Sipifica11l at .. - .10. 
AuCTtON P.aloD 
:~ 4 ' 6 1 8 9 4 25 4 5 . 2 9 8 6 .. 6 5 7 5 3 b b b b 
• Significant at • - .02S. All otbu P-values significant at • < .OOJ. 
as between the two treatment conditions 
in different experimental groups. Gen-
erally, demand dd (under discrimination) 
tended to rise and flatten relative to 
the price axis in successive auction peri-
ods. DD (under competitive rules) tend-
ed to rise but not necessarily flatten, 
expecially in group VC, in successive 
auctions. 
A comparison of the distributions of 
bids under the C and D conditions for 
corresponding auction periods (Tables 3 
and 4) leaves little doubt that the vari-
ance of bids is much higher under C than 
D. The results of an F-test of H, (and 
HO is shown in Table 5. Each F entry 
to bid high if they hoped to tender suc-
cessful bids. However, much of this 
extreme variation may be attributable 
to the effect of a single subject in VC who 
entered two bids of over 100.00 in the 
trial auction and in most of the auctions 
thereafter. This seems to have induced 
subsequent bids (up to nine) at very high 
levels by subjects seeing that (1) very 
high bids guaranteed success and (2) 
that enough other subjects entered cau-
tious low bids to yield reasonably low 
purchase prices. By the fifth auction 
three subjects were entering bids at $0.05 
or 0 (see Appendix III), apparently to 
be certain of limiting their losses to a 
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single bid in the event tbat the number 
of exorbitant bids should exceed the 
eighteen-unit offering. Many of the very 
high and very low bids are perhaps 
therefore attributable to the high bids 
submitted, and then advertised in the 
subsequent announcement, by a single 
subject. Hence, the group variance of 
bids under C may vary sharply in differ-
ent groups depending upon whether a 
group contains a subject willing to bid 
almost without limit to be sure of suc-
cess. Such a hid is analogous to orders to 
"buy at market" on the organized stock 
exchanges. An order "buy at market" 
those appearing on its left in the order 
sequence. The test statistic P is formed 
by taking each bid tendered by a D 
group, starting with the lowest and 
counting the number of bids in the cor-
responding C group that arc greater. U 
for the ith bid in a D group there are 
N, larger bids in the parallel C group, 
then 
P=~N,. 
' 
As the sample sizes increase, the distri-
bution of P converges rapidly to the 
normal.' 
TABLE 6 
JONCK.HEERE TEST OF 82 A.."l D _a: 
B~ > B1, 
Z , U~ttr No.2KAL Dcvv.n 
Paired No, of 
Experiments- ReJected 1 ·~ Bodt rrw.ruc .... ..... 8 3.3 6.0 6.1 ID·IlC . .. . .... . .. 12 3.6 3.9 4.3 
IVD·VC . .. ....... 16 -1.0 -0.7 0.5 
placed with a stock broker instructs him 
to obtain title to the security on what-
ever terms are required. There is no 
upper limit to the purchase price. 
Since H1 is very strongly confirmed 
it is clear that the testing of H, and m 
cannot be based upon the assumption 
that the C and D populations of bids 
have a common variance. Therefore, 
instead of a t.test on bid means, our 
fundamental hypothesis, H,, will be 
tested by the Jonckheere procedure,' 
which is a non-parametric (rank-order) 
test of the hypothesis that k random 
variables have been ordered a priori so 
that each is stochastically larger than 
Aocnos PUIOD 
·~k :,k 9 10 4.5 4.6 2.8 4. 1 4.0 . .. .. . 1.4 1.4 0.4 0 .0 0.0 0 I 0 .6 
Table 6 contains the values of the 
unit normal deviate, Z, computed (or 
each auction period, on the a priori 
hypothesis tbat bids under condition C 
would have higher ranks than those un-
der D. In. the first two sets of paired 
groups, corresponding to eight and 
twelve rejected bids, the Z values are 
significant at " < .001. H, and H~ are 
• A. R. Jonckheere. "A Test of Significance for 
the Relation between m Rankings and I; Ranked 
Categories,.u Brili.s/1 Journ4l of Slalidiwl Pt)-ehol· 
ogy. Vll (November, 1954), 93- 100, and idem, "A 
Dislrlbution-Free k-Sample Test agninst Ordered 
AlterMlives/' Biometrika, XLI Uune, 1954), 133-
45. 
7 Jonclc.heere, "A Distribution-Free k--Sample 
Test against O_rdered Alternatives/' p. 140. 
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confirmed under these conditions. How-
ever, in the third pair of experiments, 
with sh.-teen rejected bids, H, is not con-
firmed. The Z values are small, and even 
negative in the first two auctions. Nega-
tive Z here means that the bids under C 
tend to be lower in rank than under D-
the reverse of the order predicted by H,. 
These results suggest that we can expect 
bids under the C treatment to exceed 
those under D when the proportion of 
rejected bids is small or moderate. But 
this ordering relationship is reversed 
when the proportion of rejected bids 
approaches half the number of bids 
tendered. 
2800 
2700 
2600 
2500 
~ 2400 
~ 
¢.2300 
lzzoo 
2100 
2000 
19oo mo 
1800 '--7----c-;-~.~~.-.~~~­
Auetion Petiod 
FIG. 6.-Seller revenue by auction pedodj test of 
H~, R'c > R'o · 
Data relevant to the testing of H, and 
Hj are contained in Figures 6, 7, and 
8, showing the total revenue accruing to 
a monopolistic seller, in each auction 
period, under the C and D conditions. 
H, is supported by every observation 
in the experimental groups in which 
twelve bids were rejected (Fig. 7). How-
ever, Ha is supported only in the tenth 
auction, where sixteen bids are rejected 
in each auction period (Fig. 8). Hi is 
also supported by every observation 
(Fig. 6). 
The results of J onckheere tests of H, 
and H, are shown in Table 7. As sug-
gested in our discussion of these hy-
2800 
2700 
2600 
2500 
~ 2400 
~ 2300 
~ 2200 
2100 
2000 
1900 
nc 
r;nc 
/
10 
12 
ID 
1800 .__,__2,_~,~.,...--.,..-=.~7;--.;,0---:9:---=10 
Auc;lion Period 
FIG, 7.-Seller revenue by auction periodj)cst o£ 
Ha,~>R'0 • 
2700 
~:::m,A 
:. 2300 
~ 2200 
2100 lZC 
1900 
llC 
1000 .__,_...,2,..._,.., ---..-.,...__~. --;7~0,_.,.. _,I(),.. 
Auelicn Period 
FIG. 8.-Se!Jer revenue by auction period; tesl of 
Ha, R~ > Ro. 
potheses, the ordering relation Bh 
(16) > Bh (12) > Bh (8) holds for 
discrimination, but the ordering B~ 
(16) > B~ (12) for competition is not 
confirmed. It is suspected that, under 
condition D, increasing the number of 
rejected bids beyond sixteen would not 
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significantly increase the level of bids 
tendered, but this was not tested. (In 
Fig. 5 it is seen that the discrimination 
bids are crowding the mean, $1.55, of 
the resale-price-density function.) 
Therefore, under condition C, in-
creasing the number of rejected bids 
does not raise the level of bids tendered. 
This simply means that the effect of the 
C condition completely dominates the 
effect of the number of rejected bids. 
These results suggest that the outcome 
of a discrimination auction may depend 
crucially upon the number of bidders, 
the resale-price density. Since it has 
often been assumed or claimed that the 
stakes involved in laboratory experi-
ments are small enough to approximate 
subject utility with a linear function, 
these theorems provide us with a test of 
this assumption. Examination of the 
data in Appendix III reveals that in the 
D auctions only three subjects ap-
proached consistency in tendering equal 
bids: number 7 in HID, 17 and 28 in 
ND. In the C auctions only two sub-
jects tendered both bids at $1.55: num-
ber 4 in IIC and 9 in IIIC. Five out of 
TABLE 7 
}ONCK.HEERE T EST OF H. AND H, 
81.(16) > 8~(12) > B~(B), Bb(I 6) > BH! 2) 
Z , 0~11' N OillAL DltVlAl'E AuCTtos PDJoo 
Compared Experiments• . 
-------1----1--- - 1------------
H,: IDD-ID-IVD .. . 
H,: IIC-VC .. .. .. . ... . 
6. 1 
-1.3' 
5.4 
-o.s• 
5 .9 
-o.s• 
5.0 
0.6 
3 .6 
-0 . 1' 
•In order of (1) increasing proportion of rejected bids a.nd (2) predicted increuin« level of bub . 
lo Nena.tive values indicate th&t lt \•tl of bids decre~nts as proportion of reje<:ted bids i,.uttuer in C t.reatm~ t, 
coot.rary to prediction. All other Z valui:S ~ 5i.gni6cant at a< .001 in the predicted direction. 
whereas the outcome of the same offering 
under competition may be relatively 
independent of the number of bidders. 
This is further confirmed by comparing 
the seller-revenue curves for IIID, ID, 
and ND and for IIIC, IIC, and VC in 
Figures 6, 7, and 8. Under the D condi-
tion we have R!n (16) > R\:, (12) > 
R'n (8) for all auction periods. But 
under C, seller revenue is not unam-
biguous!/ larger the greater the number 
of rejected bids. 
In Appendix I it is shown that an 
expected-profit maximizer (utility linear 
in money) would submit bids p,• = 
p: < P in a D auction, and p~• = 
p:• = P in a C auction, where P (= 
$1.55 in the experiments) is the mean of 
seventy-seven subjects tendered bids 
consistent with the postulate that utility 
is linear in money! 
In terms of utility theory, these rather 
negative results could have any of sev-
eral interpretations: (1) Subjects may 
tend to be expected-utility ma.··dmizers, 
where utility is linear in money, but with 
"noise" in their decision behavior or 
perceived utilities. (2) Subjects may tend 
to be c~:pected-utility maximizers, but 
utility is nonlinear in money. (3) Subjects 
may tend to be expected-utility maxi-
mizers but with other variables, besides 
money, in the utility function. One ob-
vious such variable is bid variety-it 
may be boring, tedious, or just "uninter-
esting" to enter the same two bids auc-
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tion after auction. Some utility may 
therefore be derived from bid variety, 
and the lower the cash rewards the 
greater the relative strength of the urge 
to diversify. 8 A test for such effects 
might be obtained by replication of the 
above experiments, with double the cash 
rewards, as a means of reducing the 
relative importance of bid variety in 
determining bid behavior. 
VII. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
This paper has initiated an experi-
mental investigation of the effect of dis-
crimination, competition, and the rela-
tive number of rejected bids on the level 
of bids tendered by subjects and the 
receipts of a monopolistic seller. The 
experimental paradigm is one in which 
subjects tender bids for an abstract com-
modity offered inelastically at a stated 
quantity. Purchase price to the indi-
vidual is determined by his bid (if it is 
accepted) in the discriminative auction. 
It is determined by the lowest of all the 
accepted bids in the competitive auction. 
The abstract commodity is then sold at 
a price determined by a rectangular-
mass function. The essence of the de-
cision task is to determine at what levels 
to tender two bids, with knowledge only 
of the results of the previous auctions 
(the high and low accepted bids) and 
of the rectangular distribution of resale 
. pnce. 
The results of six experiments lend 
tentative support to the following con-
clusions: 
1. The variance of competitive bids 
is consistently greater than the variance 
a Sidney Siegel ("Decision-Making and Learning 
under Varying Conditions of Reinforcement," An-
nals of the Ne-dl York Academy of Science, LXXXIX 
Uanuary 28, 1961], 766-83) has employed a similar 
utility interpretation of differential behavior, under 
various reward conditions, in the binary-choice 
probability experiment. 
of discriminative bids. This discrepancy 
in bid variance tends to widen as the 
proportion of rejected bids increases. 
2. For proportions of rejected bids 
that are low or moderate, competitive 
bids tend to stochastically dominate 
discriminative bids, that is, the probabil-
ity of any bid Y or less being received 
tends to be greater for the discriminative 
auction than for the competitive auction. 
The proposition fails for a high propor-
tion of rejected bids, where "high" seems 
to be in the neighborhood of 50 per cent. 
3. The total receipts of a monopolistic 
seller are greater in a competitive auction 
than in a discriminative auction when 
the proportion of rejected bids is low 
or moderate. The proposition fails when 
there is a high proportion of rejected 
bids. 
4. Discriminative auctions with a high 
proportion of rejected bids tend to 
stochastically dominate discriminative 
auctions with a lower proportion of re-
jected bids. The proposition does not 
hold in competitive auctions. 
5. The total receipts of a monopolistic 
seller are greater, the greater the propor-
tion of rejected bids in a discriminative 
auction. The proposition does not hold 
in competitive auctions. 
6. The bids of only five out of seventy-
seven subjects can be considered reason-
ably consistent with the postulate of a 
linear utility for money. However, the 
bids of the remaining seventy-two sub-
jects do not necessarily imply utility 
functions that are non-linear in money 
if bid diversity itself is an argument of 
the utility function. 
This study does not claim to be defini-
tive. Only the surface is scratched. For 
given values of the treatment variables-
market organization and proportion of 
rejected bids-the variability due to 
different subject groups has not been 
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determined: some of the experiments 
should be replicated with different sub-
jects to see if our results are confirmed. 
The constraint that no more than two 
bids are to be submitted by each subject 
is arbitrary and should be relaxed in 
later studies. The interesting set of ex-
periments in which the number of bids 
to be submitted is also a decision vari-
able are yet to be performed. In our 
experiments several subjects entered at 
least one of their two bids at levels so 
low that it was almost sure not to be ac-
cepted. Presumably such subjects would 
not have tendered additional bids, or at 
least not at effective levels. However, 
other subjects consistently risked two 
high bids and no doubt would have been 
tempted to tender additional high bids 
if given the opportunity. The result 
might render all auctions relatively in-
dependent of the number of bidders, 
with the number of bids submitted per 
subject varying inversely with the num-
her of subjects for a given quantity 
offering. 
It would be of interest to develop a 
more specific experimental simulation of 
the Treasury auction, with subjects per-
mitted to enter either "competitive" or 
" non-competitive" bids in the D auction. 
Instead of a rectangular mass for re-
sale price, samplings could be made 
from the actual historical frequency 
distribution J(P0 - P8 ) , where Po is 
price in the existing-asset market at the 
time of delivery of new bills and P 8 is 
price in the existing-asset market at the 
time bids are tendered. In this para-
digm, the subjects would be given P8 
(since such information is available to 
bidders in the bill market), as well as 
the quantity offering, at the beginning 
of each auction. 
These are but a few of many possible 
variations on the present experiments 
that could sharpen or broaden the con-
clusions. 
APPENDIX I 
BIDDING THEORY 
In this Appendix we develop static ex-
pected-utility models of individual decision 
behavior in discriminative and competitive 
auction markets. In the first model, Section 
A, we assume that the individual buyer has 
a fixed resale or limit price above which he 
will not bid for a unit of the commodity. 
This case provides the theory for the illus-
tration in Figure 1 and, under the simplest 
set of assumptions, gives some analytical 
foundation for the intuitive conjecture that 
an individual may bid lower in a discrimina-
tive than in a competitive auction. This first 
model would apply in a situation in which 
the individual bidders had fixed limit prices 
above which they would or could not bid for 
units of the commodity or had certain 
known prices at which they could resell units 
of the commodity. 
The second model, B, provides a static 
theory of bidding behavior for subject be-
havior in the several e.~eriments reported 
in this paper in which the subjects buy units 
of an abstract commodity for resale at a 
price whose frequency distribution is known. 
Thus, the value of the traded item (resale 
price) is uncertain at the time bids are sub-
mitted. 
A. LIMIT OR RESALE PRICE FIXED 
For a typical buyer we assume the follow-
ing: 
1. A utility function of money, U(m), 
with U(O) = 0. 
2. A subjective density function f(x) for 
the minimum successful bid, x, in a dis-
criminative auction, and g{x) in a competi-
tive auction; that is, for the discriminative 
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case, the cumulative distribution function 
F(l) = JV(x)d:tis the subjective probability 
that the minimum successful bid in a par-
ticular auction will be t or less. 
3. Expected-utility-ma:rimization bid-
ding behavior. 
In a price-discrimination auction, the 
payoff to an individual will be .. = P - p, 
if p ;:: x (his bid is successful), and 11' = 0, 
if p < :t (his bid is unsuccessful), where Pis 
the individual's limit or resale price and pis 
his bid price for a sinJ!le unit or fixed lot of 
the item. Therefore, given U(m) and /(:>:) 
for such an auction, a subject who is a von 
Neumann-Morgenstern-Savage, subjective-
expected-utility maximizer, should "':' 
Eo(U), where 
E 0 (U) = J.'u(P-p)j(x)dx, 
for an individual entering a single bid. 
Eo(U) is ma.-cimum at p* if 
aEo = U(P- p*)j(p*) 
ap 
- U'(P-p*)F(p*) =0. 
(Al) 
For an interior maximum at p•, one must 
also have 
ual for a successful bid is independent of his 
bid, namely, 11' = P - x, if p ;:: x, and .. = 
0, if p < :>:. Expected utility in such an auc-
tion is therefore 
E 0 (U) = J.'ucP-x)g(x)dx 
for a single bid. We assume g(x) to be differ-
ent from f(x), since the individual bidders 
will expect the minimum successful bid to be 
different, presumably lower, under dis-
U'(P-p)F(p) 
UIP-p)ftp) 
F1c. 9.--Qptim.al price bids under discriiTinatlon 
and competition. a;;~= U(P- p*)j'(p*) 
- 2U'(P- p*)j(p*) 
+ U"(P- p*)F(p*) < 0. 
(A2) crimination than under competition. That 
is, we would expect 
The inequality in (A2) can be taken as a 
postulate, or, if we assume diminishing mar-
ginal utility, U" < 0, and a unimodal den-
sity j(p), then the inequality necessarily 
holds for solutions p• above the mode, since 
in that regionj'(p) < 0. Geometrically, the 
condition (A2) requires the function 
U(P - p)f(p) to cut U'(P - p)F(p) from 
above at p•. Hence, if U'(P - p) > 0, 
F(p) > 0 (as seems reasooable), the solution 
p• < P will be at point D, as illustrated in 
Figure 9. 
In a competitive auction, by contrast, 
since all bids are filled at the uniform mar-
ket-clearing price, the payoff to an individ-
F(t) = J.'f(x)dx;o:G(t) = J.'g(x)dx 
for all I. For"':' Ec(U) at p•• we must have 
0~0 =U(P-p**)g(p**)=O. (Al') 
But if U (P - p) > 0, and f(p) > 0 on 
0 $ p < P, and U (P- p) = 0, when p = 
P, the equality can only be satisfied at 
p•• = P. That is, the theorem requires 
the individual to have a positive utility 
for money and to believe that there is 
at least some small probability that the 
minimum successful bid will be as high 
as his limit, P. Hence, as is intuitively 
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obvious, in competitive auctions the e..'C· 
peeled-utility maximizer will bid his full 
limit or resale price, P. There is no penalty 
for winning the bid at a price above the 
market-clearing price, so the bidding prob-
lem reduces to the obvious one of ma.'timiz-
ing the chance of success. This is accom-
plished by bidding the maximum possible, 
at P, as illustrated in Figure 9 at point C 
(competition). 
Hence, under the above assumptions, we 
conclude that a maximizer would bid lower 
under discrimination than under competi-
tion. 
FJG. 10.--0ptimal price bids under discrimina~ 
tion and competition. 
B. LD!IT OR RESALE PRICE UNCERTAIN 
Where the individual is to submit a single 
bid to buy a single unit or fixed lot of the 
item, we again assume a utility function 
U(P - p) if the bid is successful, U(O) = 0 
otherwise. In addition, for the discrimina-
tive auction we assume a subjective joint 
density f(x, P), where :t is the lowest ac-
cepted bid and P the resale price. Similarly, 
for the competitive auction we assume a 
subjective joint density g(x, P). 
In the discriminative auction, expected 
utility is now 
EvCU) = f.~f."u<P- p)j(x, P)d:tdP. 
Expected utility is ma.,imum at p• if 
oE0 =I(p•)-J(p*)=O (Bl) 
ap 
and if 
a•E 
a/=I'(p*) -J'(p*) <0, (B2) 
where 
I(p*) = f.mU(P- p*)j(p*,P)dP, 
l mlp' J(p*)= o o U'(P-p*) 
X {(:t, P)dxdP. 
In a competitive auction, expected utility 
for the same bidder would be 
A maximum at p•• requires 
aEc 
""ii=K(p**)=O, (B3) 
a;:~= K'(p••) < 0, (B4) 
where 
K(p**) = ~.~U(P-p**) 
Xg(p**,P)dP. 
The condition (B2) requires I(p) to cut 
J(p) from above at p•, as shown in Figure 
10. In order for p•• to exceed p• we see from 
Figure 10 that it is sufficient for K(p) to lie 
above I(p) - J(p) in the region above p*. 
That we may have p•• > p• is readily dem-
onstrated. For e.<arnple, consider the case in 
which utility is linear in money, U(tn) a m. 
Then (Bl) can be written 
J.m (P- p* )j(p*, P)dP 
- J.m !.II' j(.t, P)dxdP= 0. 
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The second term is the cumulative marginal-
probability function F,(p*). Substituting 
j(p•, P) = j(P I p*)j,(p*) we get 
j. (p*) [E, (PIp*) - p•] = F, (p*) . (B 1 ') 
Similarly, (B3) becomes 
g, (p**) [E, (Pip**)- p••J = 0. (B2') 
If we make the reasonable assumption that 
expected resale price in the discriminative 
auction cannot be greater than that in the 
competitive auction, that is, 
P(p•) = E,(Pip*) ~ E, (Pip••) 
high bid is successful, and 0 if neither bid is 
accepted. A relative maximum occurs at 
(p:, P:J if 
aEo 1= • • ap.= 
0 
U(2P-p, -p,) 
Xj(p~,P)dP 
1
=1'' ' • • 
-
0 0 
U (2P-p 1 -p,) (B6) 
Xj(x, P)dxdP 
1= • • - 0 U(P-p, )j(p,,P)dP=O, 
then from (Bl') and (B2') 
p•=P(p*) _F,(p*) <f>(p*) j,(p*) 
"" f> (p**) ' aEo 1=1'' • • 
ap, =- o o U'(2P-p, -p,) 
~P(p••>=p••. 
This assumption surely holds in the experi-
mental design in this paper, since the (rec-
tangular) distribution of resale price is iden-
tical in the C and D auctions. 
The conclusion is that a bidder submit-
ting a single bid may (and we predict that he 
will) bid lower in a discrin1inative auction 
than in a corresponding competitive auc-
tion. 
In our experiments the subjects are per-
mitted to submit up to two bids each. We 
will therefore extend the above bidding the-
ory to this case. 
Let 0 ~ p1 ~ p, be the two bids to be 
submitted. In the discriminative auction 
expected utility would be 
ED(U)= J.=f.''u(2P-p,-p,) 
Xj(x, P)dxdP (BS) 
1=1.'' + U(P -p,)j(x,P)dxdP, 0 •• 
where the utility is U(2P - p, - p,) if both 
bids are successful, U(P - p,) if only the 
Xj(x, P)dxdP 
r=l.: • 
- J. U'(P- P•) 
0 •• 
Xj(x,P)dxdP=O, 
and if 
I ~ E~~ >0, E~<O. Eu E., 
If utility is linear in money, (B6) and 
(B7) can be written 
j. (p1) [E, (PI P1) - P1l - F, (p1) = 0 , 
and 
j, (p~) [E, (Pip~)- p:J F,- (p~) = 0, 
where 
E,(Pip~)= f.=PJ(P i p~)dP. 
HenceP(pn =P(p:J > g =Pi· If utility 
is linear in money the theory implies that an 
individual submitting two bids should enter 
them at the same price and at a price below 
the mean of the subjective density of resale 
price. 
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E:q>ected utility in a competitive auction 
is 
E°CUl = J.~f.''uc2P-2:r:) 
Xg(x,P)dxdP (B8) 
+1~1''ucP- :r:l 
0 •• 
Xg(x,P)cl=dP. 
If U(m) s m, we can write (D9} and 
(BlO) in the form 
~~~ = J.wcP-p~*)g(Pip:*)dP 
= g(p:*)[E.(Pip~*) -pt•J =0 
and 
Necessaryconditionsforaminimwncanbe iJE" =l~(P-p~*) 
written ap, 0 
iJEC 1~ •• aj;~ 
0 
U(2P-2p, ) 
Xg(p: 0 ,P)dP 
(B9) 
l e 00 - 0 U(P-p, ) 
Xg(p:•,P)dP=O 
and 
iJEO 1~ •• 
-= U(P-p, ) 
ap, 0 (BlO) 
Xg(p:*,P)dP=O. 
And for a relative ma.ximwn, 
I
E:i E:;l >O,E~<O. 
Ei.Ef. 
Xg(Pip:*)g(p:• )dP 
= g(p:*) [E, (Pip:•)- p:•] = 0, 
and bence!l(p:•) = P(p:•) = p:• =Pi*. 
If utility is linear in money, an individual 
submitting two bids in a competitive auc-
tion will enter both bids at the mean of the 
subjective density of resale price. 
Thus, if e.tpected resale price under com-
petition is not less than its value under dis-
crimination, p: = P: < f>(p:J = P(pt) :5 
f>(p:•) = f>(p:*) = p:• = p:•, then, for 
utility that is linear in money, an individ-
ual's bids under discrimination will be lower 
than his bids under competition. 
APPENDIX II 
INSTRUCTIONS 
'tXPERnCENTS W 1 mD, IVO 
(DISCIUM.lNATIVE) 
This is an experiment in the economics of 
market decision-making. The National Sci-
ence Foundation has provided funds for con-
ducting this research. The instructions are 
simple, and if you follow them carefully and 
make good decisions you may earn a consid-
erable amount of money. 
1. You will be given a starting capital 
credit balance of $1.00. Any proftt earned 
by you in the experiment will be added to 
this swn, and any losses incurred by you 
will be subtradecl from this swn. Your net 
balance at the end of the experiment will be 
calculated and paid lo you in real money. 
2. This experiment will simulate a certain 
kind of mar.ket in which you will act as 
buyers in a sequence of trading periods. 
Each trading period begins with an an-
nouncement indicating the quantity of the 
fictitious commodity that is offered for sale. 
3. In each period, your task is to attempt 
to buy units of the commodity by submit-
ting written bids for it in competition with 
other buyers. Each unit that you are able to 
purchase is then resold by you at a price 
whose detennination is explained below in 
paragraph 5. The procedure for determin· 
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ing whether a bid for a unit is accepted, 
and the purchase price of that bid, will be 
explained in paragraph 6. 
4. If a bid is not accepted your profit is 
zero. If a bid is accepted, you make a profit 
equal to the difference between your selling 
price and your purchase price. If this differ-
ence is negative, it represents a loss. That is, 
your profit for each unit is: profit = (sell-
ing price) - (purchase price). 
5. For all bids that are accepted, there-
sale price of each unit is determined by a 
random drawing (using a random-number 
table) from the following nine numbers: 
$1.15, $1.25, $1.35, $1.45, $1.55, $1.65, 
$1.75, $1.85, and $1.95. Each of these prices 
is equally likely to be drawn, itt each market 
period. Since there are nine prices, this 
means that there is at chance that any one 
price will be drawn in any market period. 
For example; if $1.25 is drawn in one pe-
riod, this has no effect on the i chance that 
$1.25 will be drawn in any later market 
period. 
You know the range within which the 
selling price will fall, $1.15-$1.95, and you 
know that each price in this range has a t 
chance of occurring. But you do not know in 
advance, at the time you enter your bids to 
buy, what the exact selling price will be. 
6. Whether a bid is accepted, and at what 
price, is determined as follows: Suppose 
X units are offered for sale at the begin-
ning of a market period. Each bidder sub-
mits two written bids on cards supplied 
for this purpose. Each bid specifies a price 
for a single unit of the commodity. The bid 
prices must be in dollars and cents and end 
in the digit 5, for example, $1.35, $0.75, 
$0.45. These bids will be collected and then 
arrayed in descending order from the highest 
to the lowest. With X units offered for sale, 
the first X of these bids (starting with the 
highest) will be accepted, and the remaining 
bids will be rejected. In the case of ties at 
the lowest accepted bid price, random num-
bers will be used to determine which bids 
are to be accepted. The highest and lowest 
bids will then be announced. Each accepted 
bid will represent the purchase of one unit of 
the commodity at a purchase price equal to 
your bid price. Therefore, the higher your bid 
price the smaller is your potential profit on 
that bid if it is accepted. But the higher your 
bid the more likely it will be above the low-
est accepted bid and thereby be accepted. 
You must weigh these considerations care-
fully in deciding upon each bid price to be 
submitted. A bid of zero is acceptable and is 
essentially equivalent to not entering a bid, 
or "standing pat." 
7. Consider a numerical example. Sup-
pose Jones submits two bids-one at $1.45 
and another at $0.65. Suppose that the 
array of bids and the quantity offered are 
such that the highest accepted bid is $1.55 
and the lowest is $0.45. Since both of 
Jones's bids were above $0.45, they are 
accepted. He bas purchased one unit at 
$1.45 and another at $0.65. Now assume 
that the result of the drawing to determine 
selling price yields a price of $1.35. Then 
Jones has incurred a profit of $1.35 -
$1.45 = -$0.10, a loss on one unit and a 
profit of $1.35 - $0.65 = $0.70 on the sec-
ond unit. His net profit is $0.60 on the two 
bids. 
As another example, suppose Jones sub-
mits bids at $0.85 and $0.25. Assume that 
the highest accepted bid is $1.25 and the 
lowest is $0.55. Then Jones's high bid was 
accepted while his low bid was not. That is, 
he has purchased one unit at $0.85. Now let 
the result of the random drawing be a selling 
price of $1.65. His profit on the single unit is 
$1.65 - $0.85 = $0.80. 
(Paragraphs 6 and 7 were supplemented 
with graphical illustrations like Figure 1, 
without the shaded area, but with the bids 
indicated in these paragraphs shown on the 
graphs.) 
You are not to reveal your bids, or profits, 
nor are you to speak to any other subject 
w bile the experiment is in process. 
Are there any questions? 
EXPER.IMENTS nc, me, VC (COMPETITIVE) 
The instructions for the competitive 
treatments were the same as for the dis-
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criminative except for paragraphs 6 and 7 as 
follows: 
6. \Vhether a bid is accepted, and at 
what price, is determined as follows: Sup-
pose X units are offered for sale at the begin-
ning of a market period. Each bidder sub-
mits two written bids on cards supplied for 
this purpose. Each bid specifies a price for a 
single unit of the commodity. The bid prices 
must be in dollars and cents and end in the 
digit 5, for example, $1.35, $0.75, and $0.45. 
These bids will be collected and then ar-
rayed in descending order from t.he highest 
to the lowest. \Vith X units offered for sale, 
the first X of these bids (starting with the 
highest) will be accepted, and the remaining 
bids will be rejected. In the case of ties at 
the lowest accepted bid price, random num-
bers will be used to determine which bids are 
to be accepted. The highest and lowest bids 
will then be announced. Each accepted bid 
will represent the purchase of one unit of the 
commodity at a purchase price equal to the 
ltrcJJesl accepted bid price, not your bid price. 
Therefore, your potential profit is not de-
creased if your bid is above the lowest ac-
cepted bid. The higher your bid the more 
likely it will be above the low bid and there-
by be accepted. But your cost and potential 
profit are determined by the lowest accepted 
bid, not your bid. A bid of zero is acceptable 
and is essentially equivalent to not entering 
a bid, or "standing pat." 
7. Consider a numerical example. Sup-
pose Jones submits two bids-one at $1.45 
and another at $0.65. Suppose that the 
array of bids and the quantity offered 
are such that the highest accepted bid 
is $1.55 and the lowest is $0.45. Since 
both Jones's bids were above $0.45, they are 
accepted. He has purchased two units at 
$0.45. Now assume iliat the result of the 
drawing to determine selling price yields a 
price of $1.35. Then Jones has made a profit 
of $1.35 - $0.45 = $0.90 on each unit, or 
a total of $1.80 on the two bids. 
As another example, suppose Jones sub-
mits bids of $0.85 and $0.25. Assume the 
highest accepted bid is $1 .25 and the lowest 
is $0.55. Then Jones's high bid was accepted 
while his low bid was not. That is, he has 
purchased one unit at $0.55. Now let the 
result of the random drawing be a selling 
price of $1.65. His profit on the single unit is 
$1.65 - $0.55 = $1.10. 
-r 
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SUBJECT 
1\o. 
1 .............. . . 
2 ............... . 
3 ............... . 
4 ............... . 
5 ............... . 
6 . . ............. . 
7 ............... . 
8 ............... . 
9 ............... . 
10 ............... . 
11 ............... . 
12 ......... ... ... . 
13 ............... . 
14 ............... . 
15 ............... . 
Highest accepted bid 
Lowest accepted bid 
Resale price ...... . 
* Accept bids. 
AucTrON 0 
f1! 
$1.35* 
1.15* 
0 .65 
0.95* 
0 .55 
1.35* 
0.95* 
0 .65 
1.05* 
1.35* 
1 .15* 
1.05* 
1.05* 
1.25* 
1.45* 
,. 
$1.15* 
0.55 
0.45 
0. 75 
0.45 
0 .85* 
0 .85* 
0.45 
0. 75 
1.15* 
O.R5* 
0.35 
0.85 
0.95* 
0 . 75 
$1.45 
0.85 
1. 75 
APPENDIX III 
A. EXPI::RThlE~TAL DATA, ID 
AUCTION 1 
Pt 
$1. 25* 
1.25* 
0.85 
0 .95 
1.05* 
1.25* 
0.95* 
1.15* 
1.25* 
1.05* 
1 .05* 
1 .05* 
1.05* 
1.15* 
1.35* 
Pt 
St. os• 
0.95 
0. 75 
0 .95 
0.95* 
0 .95 
0 .95* 
0 .95 
0.95 
1.05* 
0.85 
0.95 
0.95 
0.95* 
0 . 75 
$1.35 
0.95 
1.15 
AuCTION 2 
h 
$1. 25* 
1.25* 
0.95 
1.05 
1.15* 
1.05 
1.05* 
1.15* 
1.05* 
1.15* 
1.15* 
1. 25* 
1. 15* 
1.15* 
1 25* 
PI 
$1.15* 
1.15* 
0 .85 
0.95 
1.05* 
1.05 
1.05 
1.05 
1.05* 
1.05 
0 .95 
1.25* 
1.05 
0.95 
1.15* 
$1.25 
1.05 
1.95 
AUCTION 3 
112 
$1. 25* 
1.25* 
1.15* 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15* 
1.15* 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15* 
1.25* 
1.15* 
1.15* 
1 35* 
h 
$1.15* 
1.15* 
1.15* 
1 05 
1.15 
1.15 
1. 15* 
1 15* 
1.05 
1.15 
1.05 
1.25* 
1.15* 
1.15 
1.15* 
$1.35 
1.15 
1.35 
AUCTION 4 
/12 
$1. 25* 
1.25* 
1.25* 
1.25* 
1 35* 
1.25* 
1.15 
1.15 
1.25* 
1. 25* 
1.25* 
1.35* 
1 25* 
1.25* 
1.35* 
P1 
$1.25* 
1.25* 
1.15 
1.15 
1.25* 
1.15 
1 15 
1.05 
1.05 
1.25* 
1.15 
1 35* 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
$1.35 
1.25 
1.95 
AtrCTlO.N 5 
Pt. 
$1.35* 
1.25* 
1.35* 
1.25* 
1.35* 
1.35* 
1.25* 
1.25* 
1.15 
1.25 
1.35* 
1.35* 
1.25 
1.25 
1.35* 
PI 
$1. 25* 
1.25* 
1.25* 
1.25* 
1. 25 
1.35* 
1.25 
1 25 
1.05 
1.25 
1.25* 
1 35* 
1.25 
1.25 
1.25* 
$1.35 
1.25 
1.45 
~ 
SvaJECT 
No. 
1 ........... . .. . . 
2 .............. . 
3 . .....•.•.•..... 
4 ......... . .... . 
5 . ............. . 
6 ............... . 
7 ..........•....• 
8 ......... . ..... . 
9 . .............. . 
10 ............... . 
11 ............... . 
12 ............... . 
13 . .............. . 
14 ..... . ......... . 
15 . .............. . 
Highest accepted bid 
Lowest accepted bid 
Resale price ..... . . 
• Accept bids. 
A UCTIO.N 0 
" 
$1 45* 
1. 75* 
1.75* 
1.55* 
1.15* 
1.75* 
1.05 
1.85* 
0.85 
1.65* 
0.65 
1. 25* 
1.45* 
1.15* 
0 .95 
,1 
$0.75 
1.35* 
0. 75 
1.45* 
0 .85 
1.25* 
0.35 
1. 75* 
0.05 
1.25* 
0.45 
0.55 
1.05* 
1. 05* 
0 . 75 
$1 . 85 
1.05 
1. 75 
B. EXPERIMENTAL DATA, IIC 
AucnoN 1 
" $1.55* 
1.85* 
1.45• 
1.55* 
1.35* 
1. 75* 
1.75* 
1.45* 
1.15 
1.35* 
1.25* 
1.35• 
1.35• 
1.15 
1 .75* 
Pt 
$1.15 
1.35* 
0 .45 
1.55* 
0. 75 
1.25* 
1.05 
1.35* 
0.95 
1.25* 
1.15 
0.95 
1.15 
1.05 
1.25* 
$1.85 
1. 25 
1. 15 
AUC'110N 2 
h 
$1.95* 
1.65* 
1.45* 
1.55* 
1.15 
L75* 
1.35* 
1.45* 
0 .95 
1.75* 
1.55* 
1.65* 
1.45* 
1.35* 
1.65* 
h 
$1.35* 
1.55* 
0.45 
1.55* 
0.95 
1.35 
1.05 
1.35* 
0 .65 
1.45• 
1.25 
1.25 
1.35 
1.15 
1.25 
$1.95 
1.35 
1.95 
AucnON J 
h 
$1 .95* 
1 . 65* 
1.45* 
1.55* 
1.45* 
1. 75* 
1.35 
1.45* 
1.25 
1.55* 
1.55* 
1.65* 
1.55* 
1.25 
1.85* 
h 
$1.45* 
1.45* 
1.15 
1.55* 
0 .95 
1. 75* 
1.15 
1.45* 
0.95 
1.35 
1.35 
1.35 
1.45* 
1.15 
1.25 
$1 .95 
1.45 
1.35 
AD CtlON • 
h 
$2.05* 
1.55* 
1. 75• 
1.55* 
1.25 
1 . 45 
1.45* 
1.45* 
1.25 
1.75* 
1.55* 
1.65* 
1.55* 
1.85* 
1.55* 
t1 
$1.55* 
1.45• 
1.15 
1.55* 
0.95 
1.35 
1 .15 
1.45* 
0.85 
1.35 
1.35 
1 .55* 
1.55* 
1.35 
1.35 
$2.05 
1.45 
1.95 
AUCTION 5 
l>t. 
$1. 95* 
1.65* 
1.75* 
1.55* 
1. 75* 
1. 75* 
1.45 
1.45 
1.35 
1.75* 
1.55* 
1.65* 
1.55* 
1.25 
1.95* 
It 
$1.45* 
1.35 
1.55* 
0.45 
1.35 
1.65* 
1.15 
1.45 
1.15 
1.55* 
1.45* 
1.55* 
1.45* 
1.15 
1.35 
$1 .95 
1.45 
1.45 
00 
..... 
--···--
AtrCTION 0 
Su:B]ECT 
No. 
h P1 
1 .... . ... $0.95* $0.55 
2 . . ...... 0.55 0 .15 
3 .. . ..... 0 .55 0. 25 
4 ..... ... 0.95* 0. 75* 
5 . . ... ... 1.55* 1.15* 
6 ..... ... 0. 75* 0.55 
7 ..... ... 0.75* 0.65* 
8 .. ..... . 0.85* 0.65* 
9 ..... ... 1.25* 0.55 
10 .. ...... 1.05* 0. 75* 
11 . . ... ... 1.15* 0 .95· 
12 . . .. . . .. 1.05* 0.65* 
13 .... .... 0.85* 0.45 
Highest ac-
cepted 
bid ..... $1.55 
Lowest ac-
cepted 
bid ..... 0.65 
Resale 
price .... 1. 75 
* J\ccept bids. 
Aucn:oN 1 AUCTlON 2 
'h. Pt 'h. h 
$0.95* $0.85* $1. 05* SL 05* 
0.95* 0.65 1.05* 0.65 
1.45* 1. 15'* 1.35* 0.95* 
0 .95* 0.85 0.95 0.85 
1.45* 0.95* 1.35* 0.95 
0.85 0.75 0.95* 0.95 
1.15"' 0.85 1.15* 0.95* 
0.9S* 0. 75 0.95 0.85 
1.15* 0.95* 1.15* 1.05* 
1.05* 0.95* 1.05* 0.95* 
1.15* 0.95* 1.15* 0.95* 
0.95* 0.85* 1.05* 0.95* 
0.85 0.75 1.05* 0.95 
$1.45 $1.35 
0.85 0.95 
1.15 1.95 
C. EXPERIMENTAL DATA, lliD 
~ 
AUC'l'ION 3 AoC'.UON' 4 AuCTION s AocnoN 6 AuCTION 7 AoCTJON 8 
P2 Pt h Pt h P1 92 P1 h Pt J>: Pl 
$1.15* $1.15* $1.15* $1.15 $1. 25* $1. 25* $1.35 $1.25 $1.35* $1.25 $1.35* $1.25 
1.05* 0.95 1.15* 1.05 1.25* 1.15 1.25 1.25 1.35* 1.25* 1.25 1.25 
1.25* 1.05 1.35* 1.15 1.35* 1.15 1.35* 1.35* 1.35* 1.25 1.35* 1.25* 
1.05* 1.05 1.35* 1.15 1.35* 1.15 1.35* 1.35* 1.25* 1.15 1.25 1.25 
1.25* 1.15* 1.25* 1. 25* 1.35* 1.25* 1.35* 1.35* 1.35* 1.35* 1.35* 1.35* 
1.15* 1.05 1.25* 1.15* 1.25* 1.25 1.45* 1.35* 1.35* 1.25 1.35* 1.35* 
1.15* 1.05 1.25* 1.15* 1.25* 1.25 1.45* 1.25 1.35* 1.35* 1.35* 1.35* 
t.ts• 1.05* 1.25* 1.15 1.25* 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.35* 1.35* 
1.15* 1 .15* 1.15* 1.15 1.25* 1.25* 1.35* 1.35* 1.25* 1.25 1.25 1.25 
1.05* 1.05 1.25* 1.25* 1.25* 1.25 1.35* 1.25 1.35"' 1.35"' 1.35* 1.25* 
1.15* 1.15* 1.25* 1.15 1.35* 1.25* 1.35* 1.35* 1.35* 1.35* 1.35* 1.35* 
1.15* 1.15* 1.25* 1.25* 1.35* 1.25* 1.35* 1.35* 1.35* 1.35* 1.35* 1.35* 
1.05 1.05 1.25* 1.05 1.35* 1.05 1.35* 1. 25 1.35* 1.15 1.35* 1.15 
$1.25 $1.35 $1.35 $1.45 $1.35 $1.35 
1.05 1.15 1.25 1.35 1.25 1.25 
1.35 1.95 1.45 1.15 1.35 1.85 
00 
N 
Su1J)t:CT 
No. 
1 ..... ,. . t •••••••• 
2 ................ 
3 ................ 
4 .............. . . 
5 ........•....... 
6 ................ 
7 ............... . 
8 . .........•..... 
9 ................ 
10 ................ 
12 ................ 
13 ................ 
14 ... ...... ....... 
Highest accepted hid 
Lowest accepted bid 
.Resale price ....... 
* Acce-pt bid. 
AUCTION 1 
P! l>t 
$1. 25* $1 25 
1.55* 1.25* 
1.35* 1.25* 
1.35* 0.95 
1.35* 1. 25* 
1.25* 1.15 
1.45* 1.35* 
1.95* 0. 75 
1.65* 1.65* 
1.45* 0.75 
0.95 0.85 
1.45* 1.35* 
1 55* 0.85 
$1.95 
1.25 
1.35 
AucnON 2 
h />1 
$1.35 $1.25 
1.55* 1. 25 
1.55* 1.35* 
1.95* 1.25 
1.55* 1.35* 
1.45* 1.35 
1.45* 1.45* 
1.85* 1.25 
1.55* 1.55* 
1.45* 1.15 
1.35* 1.35 
1.45* 1.45* 
1.55* 1.35* 
$1.95 
1.35 
1.45 
D. EXPERThfE~TAL DATA, IITC 
AucnoN 3 AucnoN .f AUCDON 5 Aucnox CS AUC1:10N 7 AucnoN 8 
P! PI P2 Pt i'z it P>t /11 ?1. Pt h Pt 
$1.35 $1.25 $1 35 $1.25 $1.35 $1.25 $1.35 $1 .25 $1.45* $1.35 $1.45* $1.35 
1.65* 1.45 1.45* 1.1.5 1.45* 1.25 1.45* 1.45* 1.55* 1.45"' 1.55* 1.45* 
1.65* 1.35 1.35 1.25 1.85* 1.45* 1.65* 1.35 1.45* 1.45* 1.45* 1.35 
1.85* 1.25 1.35 1.15 1.35 1.25 1.35 1.25 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35 
1.95* 1. 75* 1.45* 1.45"' 1.45* 1.45* 1.65* 1.45"' 1.45* 1.35 1.45* 1.45* 
1.55* 1.45* 1.55* 1.55* 1.55* 1.45 1 ~~i< ..:>.:> 1.45* 1.55* 1.45* 1.55* 1.45* 
1.45* 1.45* 1.55* 1.35* 1.55* 1.45 1.55* 1.45"' 1.55* 1.45 1 55* 1.35 
1.95• 1.95* 1.95* 1.95* 1.45* 1 45* 1.35 135 1.85* 1.85* 1.35 1.35 
1.55* 1.55* 1.55* 1.55* 1.55* 1.55* 1.55* t. s5• 1.55* 1.55"' 1. ss• 1.55* 
1.85* 1.35 1.85* 1.25 1.85* 1.35 1.85* 1.45* 1.85* 1.35 1.85* 1.45* 
1.45* 1.45 1.45* 1 45* 1.45* 1.45* 1.45* 1.45* 1.45"' 1.45 1.45* 1.45* 
1.45• 1.45 1.55* 1 .45* 1 55* 1.45* 1. 55"" 1.45* 1.55* 1.45* 1.55* 1.45 
1.85* 1. 75* 1.85* 1.65* 1.85* 1.85* 1.65* 1.25 1.55* 1.35 1.85* 1.35 
$1.95 $1.95 $1.85 $1.85 $1.85 $1.85 
1.45 1.35 1.4:5 1.45 lAS 1.45 
1.35 1.75 195 1.25 1. 75 1 35 
-- -··------ --·- ---- -·-·---·- ----
00 
(;~ 
SunJFcr 
No. 
J l. . . ......... . . . . 
12 . .. ............ 
13 .. . . . •.. . . . •... 
14 . . . . ••..• • ..• . 
15 . .. . . .... ... .... 
16 . .. . . . .... . . .... 
17 .... .. .. .... .. . 
18 .. • .. . .. ..•... .. 
20 • .. • . .•.. . ..... 
21 ...... .. ....... 
22 .•. . .•.. ... .... 
23 .......•.•..... 
24 . ' . •.•••• •• •.. 
25 
········· ··· · 26 
,, ... -······ 
27 
•••••••••••• 0 
28 ...•.•••. • .• . ..• 
Highest accepted bid 
Lo\I'CSt accepted bid 
Re!>ale price .... 
• Accept bid. 
AucnON 0 
Pt Pt 
$1.45* $1 . 25* 
1 25* 0 85 
I 15* 0 . 75 
1. 25* 1. 55* 
J . 65* L. iS* 
1.45* 0.15 
0 95 0 . 75 
0 .95 1.35* 
1.05 0 65 
0 .85 LOS 
1. 15* 0 75 
1.25* J 15* 
1.15* 0 .95 
1.2~ I 35* 
0 . 95 0 95 
I 05 I OS 
1.45* I 35* 
$1 75 
I IS 
J 75 
-· --
AUCTION 1 AUCTION 2 
Pt Pt Pt /It 
---------$1.45* ~1 . 25* $1 45* $1 25 
1.25 0 95 1 25 1.05 
1 35* 1. 25* 1 25 0 95 
1 45* 1.25 1 .35* 1 25 
1. 25* 1 IS 1 35* 1 35* 
1.15 1.05 I 15 1.25 
I 35* I 35* l 35* l 35* 
1 35* 0 95 1.35* 1. 35* 
1.15 l. 2S 1 IS 1.05 
I .JS* l. 2S* 1 3.5* 1 25 
1 15 1.15 1 15 1.15 
1.25' 1.25* 1 35* 1.2S 
I 3S* I IS 1 35* 1 .35* 
I 25* 1 2S* 1 35* 1. 25 
I OS 1 IS 1 3S* 1.35* 
l 2!\ 1 05 I 35* I 25 
I 35* 1 35* 1 J5* 1.35* 
$1 45 $1 45 
J 25 1 35 
1.15 1.95 
-· 
E. EXPERIMENTAL DATA, IVD 
AucnoN 3 AUCTION 4 AucnoN S AucnoN 6 AUCTlON 7 A ocnoN 8 AucnoN 9 AUCTION 10 
Pt PI Pt /Jl Pt /11 Pt /11 Pt Pl Pt Ps Pt Pt Pt Pt 
---
---
--- - --
---
--- - - - - ----- --$1.45* $1 .25 $1 45* $1. 35 $1 .45* $1 35 $1.45* $1 JS $1 35 $1.45 $1 .4S* $t 45 $1 45* $1 .45* $ 1 45* $1 .4·5 
I AS* 1.35 1.45* 1.35 1 .4-S J 45 1.55* 1.45* 1.45* 1. 45* 1.45* 1 45 l 45* 1.45 1 45* I 45* 
1.25 1 JS 1 55* 1.15 1.45* 1 25 1.35 1. 25 1 25 1. 25 lAS* 1 25 J 35 1.25 1.45* 1 35 
1.45* 1.25 J 45* 1.25 1 35 1 35 1.35 1.35 1 43 1.35 1.35 1 45 1 .45* 1.35 1 45 1.35 
1.45* 1.45* 1.45* 1.45* J 45* 1.45* 1 . 45"' 1.45 1.45* 1.45 1.45* 1.45 1 55* 1.45 1.55* J. 45 
1.35 1.25 1.35 I .35 1 45* 1.35 I .45* I . 45* I 45* l AS* 1 .45* 1 45 1 45 1.45 1 45* 1. 45* 
1.45* lAS* 1.45* 1.45* 1.45* I 35 1.35 1 35 1 45* 1.45* 1.55* 1 55* 1.55* 1.45* 1 ss• 1.-45* 
1 45* 1.45* 1 45* 1.45* I 45* 1 •lS* 1.45* 1.45* 1.45* 1.45* J 45* 1.45* 1 45* 1 45* 1.45 1.45 
1.45* 1.45* 1.35 1.35 1 45* I JS I. 35 l 25 1.15 1.35 I 35 1 35 1 45* 1 35 1 45* 1.35 
1 .35* 1.25 1.35* 1.25 1.45* 1 35 1 45* 1 3.5 1.-45* 1. -!5 l 45* 1.45 1.45* 1 45 I 45* 1 45* 
1.35* 1.25 1 55* 1.35 1 45* 1 45* 1 55* 1 35 1 45* 1.45 1 45* 1.45* 1. 45* 1 45 1 45* 1.45 
1.45* 1 .35* 1.35 1.35 1 4S* I. 35 1 4S* 1 JS 1 45 1.4.S 1 45* 1 45 lAS 1 45 I 45 l 45 
1 45* 1 35 1.45* 1.45* 1 45* 1 .45* 1 4S* l 45* 1 45 1 35 1.45* 1 35 1.45* 1 45* I 45* 1.43 
1.35 1 IS l . 45* t.JS 1.4S* 1. 35 1 ss• 1 45 1 55* I 45* 1 S~* 1 45* 1 45 I 45 1 45* l 45 
I 25 l. 2S 1 .. 35* I 35 1 25 1 2S 1 J5 1 35 I 45* 1.45* 1 45* 1 45 t 4S* 1 45 1. 45* 1 45 
1 35 1 15 1.45* 1 45* 1 35 J 3S 1 45* 1 45* I 45* I 4.'i 1 45" 1 45 1 55* 1 ss• 1 ss• I 55* 
1 35* 1. 35* l 35 1 35 1.45* I 45* 1 45* 1 45* I 45* 1.45* l 45 1 45 1 45* l 45 l 45 1.45 
$ 1 43 $1 . 55 $1 45 $1 55 $1 55 $1 55 $1 ss $1 55 
1.35 I 35 1 •15 1 45 l 45 1 45 I 45 1 45 
1 35 1 95 1.45 l IS 1.35 1.85 1. 55 1.35 
F. EXPERIMENTAL DATA, VC 
-- ···-- - ··· - - ~ - - - -- - - --
AvcnoN 0 AucnoN 1 AucnoN 2 AucnoN 3 AtJCI'ION. 
StmJECT 
No. 
AUCTION 5 AucnoN 6 AucnoN 7 AucnoN 8 AUCTtON 9 AUCTION 10 
Pt Pt Ps fl• Pt P• ts It Ps P• Pt Pt Pt P• p, /It p, Pt Pt P• Pt PI 
------ - - ------11 .. .. ... . ... $ 1.45* t 1.05* $ 1 25* $ 1.05 $ 1.25*' 1.05 $ 1.35 $ 1.25 $ t.5s• $ 1.45 $ LOS $ 0 00 $ 1.45 $l.J5 $ 1.45* $1 . 35 $1.45 $1.35 $1 . 55* $1.45* $1.55* $1.45 
12 ..... .... . . 1.45* 0.45 1 .35* 0. 85 1. 85* 1.25 1. 95* 1.35 1 85* 1.45 2 . 05• 0 35 2 os• 1 15 1.95* 1 35 1.85* 1. 45* 1. 95* 1.35 2, 05* 1.35 
13 .... .. ..• . . 1.35* 0.55 t.55* 0 .65 1.25 0 .55 1.25 0.55 2 15* 2 .05* 2 . 05* 1.25 2 .15* 2 os• 2 . 15* 2 os• 2.15* 2. 05* 2. 15* 2 .05* 2.15* 2.05* 
14 ...•... .•.. 1.55* 085 1.35* 0 .95 1.55* 1.05 1.55* 1.05 1 . 55* 0.95 1.55* 1.15 1.55* 1.15 1.55* 1.05 l.S5* 0. 95 1.55* 1.25 1.55* 1.25 
15 . .. •... .. . . 1. 15* 0.35 1.15* 0 .65 7. 25* 1.25* 10. 05* 1.25 u os• 1.35 10 .05* 1.45 to .o5• 1.45* to .o5• 1.35 1.95* 1.35 1 .95• 1.35 1. 95* 1.35 
16 ..•.......• 125. 15* 125.15* 255 .55* 250. 75* 255 . 55* 225 .25* 265.65* 255.55* 255.55* 24-!.45* 255 .55* 244.45• 2 .25* 2.15* 2 . 25"' 2 t5• 2. 25* 2 . 15* 1.85* 1. 75• 2.05* 1.95* 
17 . ..... .... . 1.65* 1.05* 10.00* 1.95* 1.05 0 .85 1.15 1.35 1.85* 1.85* 1 . 75* 1.55* 1.45 1. 15 1.35 L 15 1.15 1.05 1.35 t .35 1.35 1.35 
18 . ... . . .. . .. 1.15* 0.55 2 . 15* 0.75 1.15 0. 75 1.55* 1.05 1.25 1.15 1.95* 1.15 1.25 1.15 1. 25 1.15 1.15 1.05 1. 95* 0 . 95 1.55* 0.95 
19 ....... . . . • 0.65 0.55 1. 15* 0 .95 1.15 0 .95 1. 55* 1.45* 1.25 1.25 1.55* 1.45 1.35 1. 25 1.25 1.15 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 
20 . .. ..• ... .. 0.75 0.45 3.75* 1.25* 1.45* 1.25* 1.45* 1.35 5 .05* 1.45 1.55• 1.45 1.75* t . s5• 1.55* 1.45* 1.55* t . 5s• 1.65* 1.55* 1.65• 1.55 
21 •••• • •••.•. 1.45* 0.75 1. 75* 1.05 too.os• 2.55* 1. 95* 1. 95* 1.95* 1.55* 1 .75• 1.45 1.75* 1. 75• 1.75* 1. 75* t . 75* 1.75* 1. 75* 1. 75* 1.75* 1. 55* 
22 • •.. ••.•• • • 1.05* 0.75 1.15 1.05 10~.05* 1.15 t.•s• 1. 35* 1.45 1.35 1.45 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.25 L35 1.25 1.45 1 .35' 2. 05* 1.35 
23 •. .. •..• .• . 1.75* 0.55 3.55* 0 . 85 3.55* 0 .65 1. 75* 0. 95 1. 75* 0.55 3. 15* 0 .05 3. 75* 0.05 3 -~. 0.05 3.75* 1.85* 5.75* 0. 05 4.75* 0 .05 , f:J 
24 • .. .•...... 1.45* o.ss• 1.(5* 0 . 85 1. 75* 0. 05 1. 75* 0 . 05 1.75* 0 . 05 275 . 75* 0 .05 285 . 95* 0 .05 1.75* 0.05 1.75* 0 .05 1. 75* 0. 05 1. 75* 0 .05 
25 • •.. .....• . 2.05* 0.75 10.05• 0.95 105.05* 1.15 1,000.05* 1.15 200. 05* 1.25 100.05* 1. 75* tOO. o5• 1.45* 1.75• 1.75* 1. 75* 0 .05 1.45 1.15 t . s5• 0 .05 
26 • •. . •.• .. . . 0. 75 0.35 0.95 0 . 85 1.35* 1.25* 1. 35 1.35 1.45* 1.35 1.45* 1.45 1 . 45 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.45 1.35 1.45 1.45 
27 .•. • . ••• ... 0 .95* 0. 45 1.55* 0 .95 1.65* 1.15 1. 75* 1. 55* 1.75* 1.45 1.75• 1.45 1 . 95* 1.55* 1.95* 1.55* 2.05* 1.55* 2 .05* 1.5s• 2. 05* t . s5• 
Highest accept~ 
$125 . 15 $255 .55 $255 . 55 $1,000. 05 $255 .55 $275.75 $285.95 edbid ...... $10 OS $.3 . 75 $5 . 15 M.75 
Lowest accept-
0.85 ed bid ...... 1.15 1.25 1.35 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.55 
Resa.le price ... 1.75 1.15 1.95 1.35 1.95 1.45 1.15 1.35 1.85 1.55 1.35 
----···-·--·-·--
• Accepted bid. 
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